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FAMILY LAW–PROVIDING FOR THOSE WHO CANNOT PROVIDE FOR 
THEMSELVES: A PROPOSAL FOR THE ARKANSAS GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO 
FOLLOW IN THE FOOTSTEPS OF AN ALREADY EXPANSIVE GUARDIANSHIP 
LAW AND GRANT GUARDIANS THE RIGHT TO FILE FOR DIVORCE ON 
BEHALF OF A WARD 
I. INTRODUCTION 
An ambulance transports Isaac, an incapacitated person, to a nearby 
emergency room after he is involved in an accident that causes him severe 
injuries. An hour later, Isaac’s guardian, Greg, arrives. The physician in-
forms Greg that without conducting a certain operation Isaac might not live. 
Suppose that after the proposed procedure, although alive, Isaac’s condition 
deteriorates. Greg reasons that Isaac would be better off if he passed away. 
Greg petitions the circuit court, and, upon its approval, informs the physi-
cian that he would like to withhold life-saving treatment. 
In Arkansas, a guardian like Greg, upon court approval, is legally enti-
tled to do just that—petition the circuit court and then give consent to with-
hold life-saving treatment for a ward like Isaac.1 A guardian is also legally 
entitled to consent on behalf of an incapacitated person to abortion, steriliza-
tion, psychosurgery, or removal of a bodily organ.2 In life or death situa-
tions, the guardian does not even need to seek court approval for these deci-
sions.3 Moreover, upon court approval, a guardian may authorize experi-
mental medical procedures, authorize termination of parental rights, and 
prohibit the incapacitated person from voting.4 
Notably absent from these statutory powers granted to the guardian is 
the right to bring a divorce suit on behalf of the ward.5 
In the absence of a statute so authorizing it, it is the general rule that an 
insane person cannot institute an action for divorce since the right to do 
so is regarded as strictly personal to the aggrieved spouse and no matri-
monial offenses automatically effect a dissolution of the marriage.
6
 
The sustainability of this defense—that marriage is “strictly personal”—
invokes skepticism given the aforementioned powers that are now granted to 
the guardian. Moreover, in a society that has drastically transformed its ac-
 
 1. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-302(a)(1)(B) (Repl. 2012). 
 2. Id. § 28-65-302(a)(1)(A). 
 3. Id.  
 4. Id. § 28-65-302(a)(1)(C)–(E). 
 5. See id. § 28-65-302. 
 6. Jackson v. Bowman, 226 Ark. 753, 759, 294 S.W.2d 344, 347 (1956). 
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ceptance of divorce, as evidenced by the near fifty percent divorce rate 
across the country,7 a strong case can be made for the need for legislation in 
Arkansas granting a guardian the right to file for divorce on behalf of a 
ward. 
Historically, many states have struggled, and continue to struggle, with 
this question of guardianship power,8 and, in Arkansas, this is an issue that 
no appellate court has directly addressed.9 Thus, the interest of the state in 
providing clarity will be heightened when this issue presents itself in the 
future. The Arkansas legislature should be proactive in amending its current 
guardianship statute by enacting legislation that explicitly allows, upon 
court approval, for a guardian to file a divorce action on behalf of a ward. In 
light of the expansion of guardianship powers that presently provide for 
personal decisions that carry weight equal to or greater than the dissolution 
of marriage,10 this legislation would not overstep the bounds of guardianship 
power. 
Once the initial right to bring action has been established through legis-
lation, and after both standing to bring the suit and prima facie grounds to 
hear the case have been satisfied, courts should strictly adhere to a substitut-
ed judgment standard in deciding whether to grant the divorce. Under this 
strict standard, a divorce would only be permissible when objective evi-
dence of the ward’s intent to dissolve the marriage is present.11 By adhering 
to this standard, the court has the ability to curb any potential risks that 
guardians would file for divorce to promote his or her personal interests.12 
Before reaching this conclusion, it is necessary to analyze both the ra-
tionale behind the different approaches to this problem as well as the histor-
ical context of the law in Arkansas.13 In Part II.B and II.C, this note exam-
ines how other states have dealt with a guardian’s right to file for divorce in 
the absence of statutory authority and discusses the policies behind the ma-
jority opinion that guardians are legally prohibited from filing for divorce, 
as well as the contrasting minority opinion that guardians are legally entitled 
to file for divorce. Part II.D then establishes that both Arkansas divorce law 
 
 7. See Christopher Ingraham, Divorce Is Actually on the Rise, and It’s the Baby Boom-
ers’ Fault, WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/
wp/2014/03/27/divorce-is-actually-on-the-rise-and-its-the-baby-boomers-fault/. 
 8. See infra Parts II.B–C. 
 9. See infra Part II.D.2. 
 10. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-302. 
 11. Ruvalcaba v. Ruvalcaba, 850 P.2d 674, 685 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (Fidel, J., concur-
ring). 
 12. See Bella Feinstein, A New Solution to an Age-Old Problem: Statutory Authorization 
for Guardian-Initiated Divorces, 10 NAELA J. 203, 218 (2014) (noting that courts have 
imposed heightened standards on guardians to safeguard against potential abuse of power). 
 13. See infra Parts II.B–D. 
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and guardianship law are silent on this issue and that Arkansas case law is 
void of a holding on which subsequent courts may stand. 
Part III further analyzes the policy behind the minority approach as it 
relates to Arkansas and then proposes legislation that embodies the concerns 
of the minority by advocating for the guardian’s right to bring suit.14 Never-
theless, Part III.C recognizes the majority’s concern for the sanctity of mar-
riage and recommends that the court use a substituted judgment standard, 
where divorce will only be granted if it conforms to the ward’s wishes.15 
II. BACKGROUND 
This section first addresses the responsibilities guardians have in 
providing for wards, both personally and legally.16 These responsibilities, 
however, may not always extend to divorce suits on behalf of the ward. In 
addressing whether a guardian may petition the court for divorce on behalf 
of the ward in the absence of statutory authority specifying otherwise, state 
courts are divided on the issue.17 The competing rationales of each approach 
will be discussed18 before turning to the current state of the law in Arkan-
sas.19 
A. The Role of the Guardian Under Arkansas Statutory Law 
In defining the role of the guardian, it should first be established to 
whom powers of guardianship extend. Arkansas Code Annotated section 28-
65-101 defines both the ward and an incapacitated person.20 A “ward” is “an 
incapacitated person for whom a guardian has been appointed.”21 An “inca-
pacitated person” is: 
a person who is impaired by reason of a disability such as mental illness, 
mental deficiency, physical illness, chronic use of drugs, or chronic in-
toxication, to the extent of lacking sufficient understanding or capacity to 
make or communicate decisions to meet the essential requirements for 
his or her health or safety or to manage his or her estate.
22
 
 
 14. See infra Parts III.A–B. 
 15. See infra Part III.C.2. 
 16. See infra Part II.A. 
 17. See infra Parts II.B.1, II.C.1. 
 18. See infra Parts II.B.2, II.C.2. 
 19. See infra Part II.D. 
 20. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-101(5)(A), (10) (Repl. 2012). 
 21. Id. § 28-65-101(10). 
 22. Id. § 28-65-101(5)(A). An “incapacitated person” also “includes an endangered or 
impaired adult as defined in the Adult Maltreatment Custody Act, [codified at ARK. CODE 
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Any person may file a petition to the court to appoint himself as guard-
ian of another.23 In that petition, he must state the reasons why appointment 
is sought and his interest in such appointment.24 Before the court grants 
guardianship, the petitioner must satisfy all of the following: (1) the ward is 
either a minor or an incapacitated person; (2) guardianship is needed to pro-
tect the incapacitated person’s interests; and (3) the person appointed as 
guardian is qualified.25 
Once appointed by a court, the role of the guardian in caring for the 
ward is clearthe duty of the guardian is to care for and to maintain the 
ward.26 Guardianship power, however, is subject to certain limits.27 Guardi-
anship shall be “[u]sed only as is necessary to promote and protect the well-
being of the person and his or her property, [d]esigned to encourage the de-
velopment of maximum self-reliance and independence of the person, and 
[o]rdered only to the extent necessitated by the person’s actual mental, phys-
ical, and adoptive limitations.”28 Another important limitation is that the 
guardian may not promote his personal interests over those of the ward.29 
As previously addressed, the guardian must obtain a court order to 
make certain decisions for the ward.30 Yet, outside of these decisions, an 
incapacitated person “retains all legal and civil rights except those which 
have been expressly limited by court order or have been specifically granted 
by order to the guardian by the court.”31 And, because incompetents are con-
sidered to be under legal disability that renders them unable to sue or be 
sued, incompetent persons are required to appear in court through a legal 
 
ANN.] § 9-20-103, who is in the custody of the Department of Human Services.” Id. § 28-65-
101(5)(B). 
 23. Id. § 28-65-205(a) (Repl. 2012). 
 24. Id. § 28-65-205(b)(9). 
 25. Id. § 28-65-210 (Repl. 2012). 
 26. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-301(a)(1) (Repl. 2012); see also 39 C.J.S. Guardian & 
Ward § 97 (2014) (citing Jewish Home for the Elderly of Fairfield Cnty., Inc. v. Cantore, 778 
A.2d 93, 100 (Conn. 2001)) (explaining that a guardian owes a duty of loyalty to the ward 
and is bound to protect the ward’s interests). 
 27. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-105 (Repl. 2012). 
 28. Id. (citations omitted). 
 29. See Guardian & Ward, supra note 26, at § 97 (citing SunTrust Bank, Middle Ga. 
N.A. v. Harper, 551 S.E.2d 419, 426 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001)) (providing that a guardian may not 
place himself in a position in which his personal interests are in conflict with the ward’s); 
Omohundro v. Erhart, 228 Ark. 910, 911, 311 S.W.2d 309, 311 (1958) (“[T]he sole purpose 
of this guardianship is to further the well-being of the afflicted ward.”). 
 30. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-302 (Repl. 2012). 
 31. Id. § 28-65-106 (Repl. 2012). 
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guardian, a next friend, or a guardian ad litem.32 Thus, generally, a guardian 
has the right and capacity to sue on behalf of the ward.33 
Notwithstanding this general rule, states have faced, and will continue 
to face, the following issue: whether a guardian may bring a divorce action 
on behalf of the ward absent clear authority stating otherwise. This issue has 
led to two competing schools of thought.34 On the one hand, a majority of 
courts deny a guardian this right,35 while, on the other hand, some courts 
provide for such right.36 
B. The Majority Approach and Policy Reasoning Behind This Approach 
In the absence of express statutory authority, the majority rule is that a 
guardian may not file for divorce on behalf of a ward.37 This rule is most 
prominently founded upon the personal nature of marriage and the notion 
that divorce is a decision that no one other than the aggrieved spouse should 
decide.38 Pursuant to this rule, the mentally incompetent spouse lacks the 
legal capacity to make a decision concerning divorce, and a guardian cannot 
make that decision for her.39 Furthermore, courts have reached this conclu-
sion despite statutes granting a guardian authority to bring suit for civil ac-
tions on behalf of the incompetent ward.40 
1. Case Law Articulating the Majority Rule 
The following case law serves as support for the majority rule regard-
ing guardians’ authority to bring divorce suits on behalf of a ward. In Mur-
ray v. Murray,41 which was a case of first impression in South Carolina,42 
 
 32. Guardian & Ward, supra note 26, at § 255 (citing Carlos H. v. Lindsay M., 815 
N.W.2d 168, 173 (Neb. 2012)) (deciding that the law grants another party the capacity to sue 
on a minor or incompetent’s behalf because both lack legal authority to sue). 
 33. Id. 
 34. See infra Parts II.B–C. 
 35. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 36. See infra Part II.C.1. 
 37. Murray v. Murray, 426 S.E.2d 781, 783 (S.C. 1993) (citing cases from across the 
country where courts have recognized this as the majority rule). 
 38. Diane Snow Mills, Comment, “But I Love What’s-His-Name”: Inherent Dangers in 
the Changing Role of the Guardian in Divorce Actions on Behalf of Incompetents, 16 J. AM. 
ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 527, 536 (2000). 
 39. Nelson v. Nelson, 878 P.2d 335, 338 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994). 
 40. Edward B. Borris, Mentally Incompetent Spouses as Parties to Divorce Actions, 
DIVORCE LITIG., March 1997, at 52, 52; see Murray, 426 S.E.2d at 783 (“Although there are 
statutes in practically every jurisdiction which give a guardian the general authority to main-
tain actions on behalf of an incompetent, it is generally held that these statutes do not apply to 
divorce actions unless the statute expressly so states.”). 
 41. 426 S.E.2d 781 (S.C. 1993). 
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the Supreme Court of South Carolina adopted the majority rule and held that 
an incompetent spouse, if incompetent as to his person and his property, 
could not bring a divorce either on his own behalf or through a guardian.43 
The court declined to adopt an absolute rule, however, that barred the in-
competent or guardian from bringing an action in all cases.44 The court pro-
vided that a spouse may still bring suit on his own behalf or through a 
guardian if, although mentally incompetent as to the affairs of his estate, he 
is able to make reasonable decisions as to his person, to understand the na-
ture of the action, and to express a desire to dissolve the marriage.45 The 
court reasoned that it was for the judge to decide the ward’s competency as 
to his ability to comprehend personal decisions and remanded this case so 
that decision could be made.46 
Similarly, in Scott v. Scott,47 which was another case of first impres-
sion,48 the Supreme Court of Florida determined that the decision to divorce 
must remain personal to the aggrieved spouse.49 The court reasoned that 
there are no marital offenses that result in the automatic dissolution of a 
marriage.50 Rather, marriage may only be dissolved with the consent of and 
upon action by the injured spouse,51 and these are two things an insane per-
son cannot do.52 
2. The Rationale and Policy Behind the Majority Approach 
The rationale behind the majority approach is primarily focused on the 
nature of marriage and has been deemed a “lesser of two evils” approach.53 
Courts contend that divorce is strictly personal and volitional and cannot be 
maintained upon the will of the guardian,54 even though that may lead to an 
indissoluble marriage on behalf of the ward.55 In part, this reason is based on 
 
 42. Id. at 783. 
 43. Id. at 784. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. The court directed that if the spouse can express a desire to obtain a divorce, he 
may obtain a divorce through his guardian ad litem. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. 45 So. 2d 878 (Fla. 1950). 
 48. Id. at 879. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Mills, supra note 38, at 536. 
 54. Murray v. Murray, 426 S.E.2d 781, 784 (S.C. 1993). 
 55. Id.; see J.A. Connelly, Annotation, Power of Incompetent Spouse’s Guardian, Com-
mittee, or Next Friend to Sue for Granting or Vacation of Divorce or Annulment of Marriage, 
or to Make a Compromise or Settlement in Such Suit, 6 A.L.R.3D 681, § 2 (1966) (“[T]he 
right of the injured party to regard the bond of marriage as indissoluble . . . is considered so 
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the fact that no marital offenses exist that result in a dissolution of the mari-
tal relation.56 
This position has been considered the “lesser of two evils” approach, 
whereby the protection of a potential decision by the aggrieved spouse to 
stay married, even in light of marital offenses, outweighs the guardian’s 
thought that the marriage should be dissolved based on those marital offens-
es.57 The concern courts face is that a third party’s interests will override the 
wishes of the incompetent spouse.58 The conclusion is that any position oth-
er than the majority’s “would destroy the effect of condonation,” which 
“preserves to the injured spouse the right to forgive, excuse or pardon.”59 In 
the end, despite what a guardian may believe best, an aggrieved spouse may 
choose to stay in a marriage that could be deemed against her interests for 
personal, religious, moral, or economic reasons.60 Notwithstanding this ma-
jority view, a contingency of courts holds otherwise and grants a guardian 
the legal right to file for divorce on behalf of an incompetent ward. 
C. The Minority Approach and Policy Reasoning Behind This Approach 
When statutory authority does not explicitly grant a guardian the right 
to file for divorce on behalf of an incompetent ward, the minority trend in 
courts addressing this issue is to allow a guardian to do so.61 This trend 
stems from courts first recognizing both expansive guardianship rights as 
well as inequity principles62 and then relying on state divorce, guardianship, 
or civil procedure statutes for authority to allow a guardian to bring such 
action.63 
 
strictly personal that such relation should not be dissolved except with the personal consent 
of the injured spouse, which cannot be given where he or she is insane.”). 
 56. Connelly, supra note 55, at § 2. 
 57. Mills, supra note 38, at 536. 
 58. Nelson v. Nelson, 878 P.2d 335, 338 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994). 
 59. Scott v. Scott, 45 So. 2d 878, 879 (Fla. 1950). 
 60. Nelson, 878 P.2d at 338. 
 61. See id. (“Jurisdictions allowing divorce suits brought or maintained by a guardian 
are in the minority.”). 
 62. See infra Part II.C.2. 
 63. Mills, supra note 38, at 536. The New Mexico Court of Appeals in Nelson points out 
that most minority-rule courts that grant a guardian the right to bring an action for divorce do 
so by construing statutes that allow for guardians to pursue civil claims for the ward. 878 
P.2d at 338 (citing Campbell v. Campbell, 5 So. 2d 401, 402 (Ala. 1941); Ruvalcaba v. 
Ruvalcaba, 850 P.2d 674, 678 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993); Kronberg v. Kronberg, 623 A.2d 806, 
809–10 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1993)). 
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1. Case Law Articulating the Minority Trend 
Arizona and New Mexico are at the forefront of minority-rule jurisdic-
tions.64 In Ruvalcaba v. Ruvalcaba,65 the Court of Appeals of Arizona held 
that pursuant to Arizona’s guardianship provisions the guardian was not 
prohibited from bringing suit on behalf of an incapacitated ward.66 The court 
reasoned that guardians have broad authority.67 Further, the court found 
nothing in either Arizona Revised Statutes section 14-5312(A) or Rule 17(g) 
of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure that precluded a guardian from 
maintaining an action for dissolution68 and concluded that if the legislature 
wanted to prohibit third parties from bringing suit then it would have done 
so.69 The counter argumentif the legislature had wanted guardians to have 
authority, it would have included that power in the statutewas explicitly 
rejected.70 
Similarly, the decision made by the Court of Appeals of New Mexico 
in Nelson v. Nelson71 put New Mexico in the category of states that views 
the rights of the incompetent as equally important to those of the competent 
spouse.72 At the time the court decided this case, the issue was one of first 
impression in New Mexico.73 Finding Ruvalcaba instructive,74 the court also 
noted that New Mexico’s guardianship statutes grant guardians broad pow-
ers.75 The court determined that the New Mexico legislature granted guardi-
ans authority to interfere in intimately personal concerns of an individual’s 
 
 64. See Ruvalcaba, 850 P.2d at 678; Nelson, 878 P.2d at 339–40. 
 65. 850 P.2d 674. 
 66. Id. at 678. The court allowed the guardian to proceed after concluding that was what 
the ward would want, based on what the guardian knew of the ward’s preferences and general 
values regarding marriage, divorce, and manner of living. Id. at 681.  
 67. Id. at 678. Citing Arizona Revised Statutes section 14-5312, the court determined 
that the language in the statute that equates guardians’ authority over the ward to parents’ 
authority over their children was meant to illustrate the breadth of guardians’ powers. Id. 
Further, the court provided that Rule 17(g) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure states that 
a guardian “may sue or defend on behalf of . . . the incompetent person” without regard for 
the type of case. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 678–79. 
 70. Id. at 678. 
 71. 878 P.2d 335 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994). 
 72. Vincent E. Martinez, Family Law—New Mexico Expands the Power of a Guardian 
to Include the Right to Initiate and Maintain a Divorce Action on Behalf of the Guardian’s 
Incompetent Ward: Nelson v. Nelson, 25 N.M. L. REV. 295, 295 (1995). 
 73. Nelson, 878 P.2d at 337. 
 74. Id. at 339. 
 75. Id. at 339–40. Under New Mexico’s guardianship statute, the guardian has powers 
and duties related to the following: custody, care, training, education, personal effects, medi-
cal and professional care, and removing or withholding medical treatment. See N.M. STAT. 
ANN. § 45-5-312(B) (West 2009). 
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life76 and held that the mere condition of being under guardianship does not 
preclude divorce action.77 
Other cases also help illustrate the decision-making process used by 
courts in finding a legal basis for guardians to petition the court for divorce 
on behalf of a ward. In Cohn v. Carlisle,78 a Massachusetts court relied on 
the Massachusetts General Code and stated, “[p]roceedings at law and in 
equity in [sic] behalf of a person incapable of bringing an action or a suit 
may be brought in his name by his guardian, conservator, or next friend.”79 
Similarly, in Campbell v. Campbell,80 an Alabama court granted a guardian 
the right to bring divorce after construing a statute authorizing guardians to 
pursue and defend claims in the interest of the ward as well as a statute 
granting the circuit court the right to divorce persons.81 Finally, in Luster v. 
Luster,82 a Connecticut court stated: 
Given that a conserved person, except in limited circumstances, may 
bring a civil action only through a properly appointed representative, 
such as a conservator, and that an action for dissolution of marriage is a 
civil action, combined with the conserved person’s retention of all rights 
and authority not specifically assigned, we conclude that a conservator 
may bring a civil action for dissolution of marriage on behalf of a con-
served person.
83
  
In Luster, the court relied on a Connecticut statute that provides for an 
incompetent’s interests to be adequately represented, not deprived of access 
to the courts.84 The court reasoned that the law attempts to ensure that a con-
served person’s interests are not undermined by his disability85 and that the 
legislature could have restricted a conserved person’s ability to file action 
through his conservator.86 In accordance with the reasoning provided by the 
 
 76. Nelson, 878 P.2d at 340 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-312(B)). The court deter-
mined that these powers are listed without qualification and “should be read as illustrative of 
the nature of the guardian’s power.” Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. 37 N.E.2d 260 (Mass. 1941). 
 79. Id. at 262 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 201, §§ 20, 37 (West 2008) (repealed 
2008)); see also McGrew v. McGrew, 9 Haw. 475, 479 (1894) (relying on a guardianship 
statute that provided the duty to “appear for and represent his ward in all legal suits and pro-
ceedings” and reasoning that divorce is a civil proceeding). 
 80. 5 So. 2d 401 (Ala. 1941). 
 81. Id. at 402. 
 82. 17 A.3d 1068 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011). 
 83. Id. at 1080. 
 84. Id. at 1078–79. Section 45a–650(k) states, “[a] conserved person shall retain all 
rights and authority not expressly assigned to the conservator.” CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 
45a-650(k) (West 2014) (emphasis added). 
 85. Luster, 17 A.3d at 1079. 
 86. Id. at 1080. 
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court in Luster, finding such legal authority for a guardian to bring an action 
for divorce on behalf of a ward also stems from the following policy impli-
cations. 
2. The Rationale and Policy Behind the Minority Approach 
Minority-rule jurisdiction courts base their decisions on the expansion 
of guardian rights and inequity principles.87 First, courts have reasoned that 
the majority rule is no longer valid because guardians are now able to make 
personal decisions in other areas for the ward.88 This notion is exemplified 
by the court in Ruvalcaba, where the court determined that in modern times, 
when a guardian may refuse medical care on behalf of the ward, maintaining 
the same “personal” justification cannot stand.89 There, the court continued, 
“[i]f an incompetent’s right to refuse medical treatment is not expunged by 
physical or mental impairment, surely an incompetent’s right to petition for 
dissolution of marriage is similarly not destroyed by physical or mental in-
capacity.”90 
Another primary policy reason of the minority is based on an inequity 
principle—the idea that the incompetent is subject to the absolute control of 
the competent spouse if the guardian may not bring suit.91 In essence, with-
out any ability to dissolve the marriage, the incompetent spouse is left “cap-
tive” to the competent spouse.92 In such case, the incompetent could be ex-
ploited, physically injured, or even perish at the will of the competent 
spouse.93 Consequently, courts refuse to establish an absolute bar to divorce 
that would leave an incompetent spouse at the mercy of the competent 
 
 87. See, e.g., Ruvalcaba v. Ruvalcaba, 850 P.2d 674, 681 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (noting 
that a guardian now has the ability to refuse medical care); In re Gannon, 702 P.2d 465, 467 
(Wash. 1985) (providing that an incompetent spouse is subject to the control of the competent 
spouse). 
 88. See In re Gannon, 702 P.2d at 467 (“[I]n these days of termination of life support, 
tax consequences of virtually all economic decisions, no-fault dissolutions and the other 
vagaries of a vastly changing society, we think an absolute rule denying authority is not justi-
fied nor in the public interest.”); Nelson v. Nelson, 878 P.2d 335, 340 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994) 
(citing the following areas of guardianship power: charge of care, comfort, maintenance, 
education, personal effects, withholding consent to medical treatment, and consent to physi-
cian’s termination of maintenance medical treatment). 
 89. Ruvalcaba, 850 P.2d at 681. 
 90. Id. 
 91. In re Gannon, 702 P.2d at 467. 
 92. Ruvalcaba, 850 P.2d at 681. 
 93. Id. at 683–84. A guardian’s ability to file for divorce is an important protection 
measure against exploitation or abuse by the competent spouse. Id. at 685 (McGregor, J., 
concurring). 
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spouse.94 As surmised in Eichner v. Dillon,95 “the terminally ill should be 
treated equally, whether competent or incompetent” for the “value of human 
dignity extends to both.”96 
Relatedly, in Ruvalcaba, the court also addressed and countered the 
majority’s concern that the guardian’s motives would supersede those of the 
ward.97 The court noted that ulterior motives apply equally to guardians as 
well as the competent spouse.98 In those hypothetical situations, a competent 
spouse may seek, for example, financial advantage or may keep the mar-
riage intact to maintain immigration status.99 Thus, a competent spouse’s 
testimony contains just as much risk as a third party’s testimony.100 As such, 
the “ulterior motive” precaution is not a sufficient reason to bar either the 
guardian or the spouse’s testimony.101 Rather, deference should be given to 
the trial court to view the evidence, determine its credibility, and assign a 
weight to the testimony.102 
3. Competing Standards of Review Once a Guardian Petitions the 
Court for Divorce 
If a court finds that a guardian has the legal right to petition the court 
for divorce on behalf of the ward, the court must then determine whether it 
should grant the divorce. Because the ward’s wishes cannot be ascertained 
at the time of the proceedings, two prominent standards exist in guiding a 
court’s decision: (1) a substituted judgment standard and (2) a best interests 
standard.103 Under either standard, the guardian bears the burden of proof in 
establishing the ward’s wishes.104 
Under a substituted judgment standard, the guardian tries to conclude 
what the ward would have decided if he or she were competent,105 and the 
 
 94. Nelson v. Nelson, 878 P.2d 335, 339 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994); see In re Gannon, 702 
P.2d at 467 (explaining that, generally, a guardian should not determine this decision to bring 
dissolution on behalf of the ward, but some circumstances may warrant it). 
 95. 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980). 
 96. Id. at 542. 
 97. See Ruvalcaba, 850 P.2d at 682–83. 
 98. Id. at 683. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See id. at 682–83 (citing In re Ballard, 762 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Or. Ct. App. 1988)) 
(recognizing the risk is just as great that the competent spouse is biased). 
 101. Id. at 683. 
 102. Id. (citing In re Ballard, 762 P.2d at 1053). 
 103. Ruvalcaba, 850 P.2d at 682. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See Norman L. Cantor, Discarding Substituted Judgment and Best Interests: Toward 
a Constructive Preference Standard for Dying, Previously Competent Patients Without Ad-
vance Instructions, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 1193, 1201–02 (1996) (explaining that substituted 
judgment attempts to replicate the decision the incompetent would make if competent in the 
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court acts on behalf of the incompetent.106 The court determines the ward’s 
intent using objective evidence,107 such as written documents, evidence of 
oral statements while competent, or the ward’s general disposition.108 There-
fore, this standard serves as a type of “surrogate decision-making” that may 
be used only when evidence exists of the ward’s values and wishes while 
competent.109 In contrast, when no evidence exists as to the ward’s prior or 
present disposition or intent, the court will determine this issue based on 
what is in the best interests of the ward.110 
Under the best interests standard, a guardian attempts to determine 
what the ward’s best interests are at the present time,111 and the court holds a 
hearing to obtain evidence as to the best course of action for the ward.112 The 
court decides whether divorce would “further the ward’s immediate and 
long-term interests” and considers “the ward’s values, lifestyle and goals in 
making that determination.”113 Moreover, during this hearing, the court also 
considers the interests of the competent spouse.114 
Having reviewed the majority and minority approaches as well as the 
standards of review employed by courts when a guardian has the legal right 
to file for divorce on behalf of an incompetent ward, this note now turns 
toward the current state of the law in Arkansas. 
D. Current State of the Law in Arkansas 
Stare decisis, which involves a court’s choice to stand by precedent,115 
serves as a foundation of law. Additionally, it is well known that courts will 
 
current situation); Kurt X. Metzmeier, The Power of an Incompetent Adult to Petition for 
Divorce Through a Guardian or Next Friend, 33 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 949, 956 (1995) 
(explaining that the guardian attempts to determine the choice of a hypothetically competent 
ward). 
 106. Walter M. Weber, Substituted Judgment Doctrine: A Critical Analysis, ISSUES L. & 
MED. 131, 135 (1985). 
 107. See Brockman ex rel. Jennings v. Young, 2011 WL 5419713, at *4 (Ky. Ct. App. 
2011) (citing Metzmeier, supra note 105, at 958) (explaining that in determining whether it is 
proper to allow a divorce proceeding brought on behalf of a ward, courts may use evidence of 
the ward’s intent and then substitute its judgment for the ward’s). 
 108. Metzmeier, supra note 105, at 956. 
 109. Mills, supra note 38, at 544. 
 110. Brockman, 2011 WL 5419713, at *4. 
 111. Metzmeier, supra note 105, at 957. 
 112. In re Gannon, 702 P.2d 465, 467 (Wash. 1985). Cases that involve abuse, neglect, or 
possible exploitation of the ward are cases in which this standard is most aptly applied. Mills, 
supra note 38, at 544. 
 113. Feinstein, supra note 12, at 218. 
 114. In re Gannon, 702 P.2d at 467. The court will put great emphasis not only on the 
interests of the ward but also the necessities and interests of the competent spouse. Id. 
 115. Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis as Judicial Doctrine, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 411, 
412 (2010). 
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follow unambiguous statutes or attempt to interpret those that are ambigu-
ous.116 Accordingly, it is necessary to review both Arkansas case law and 
statutory law to determine whether this issue has been previously addressed 
or whether it is an issue of first impression. 
1. Arkansas Lacks Explicit Statutory Authority That Grants or De-
nies a Guardian the Right to File for Divorce on Behalf of the 
Ward 
Arkansas divorce law does not explicitly state whether a guardian has 
the authority to petition a court for divorce on behalf of a ward.117 The Ar-
kansas legislature has addressed the legal right for the competent spouse to 
bring action against the incompetent ward, but not vice-versa.118 Arkansas 
Code Annotated section 9-12-301 provides the following: 
The circuit court shall have power to dissolve and set aside a marriage 
contract, not only from bed and board, but from the bonds of matrimony, 
for the following causes: In all cases in which a husband and wife have 
lived separate and apart for three (3) consecutive years without cohabita-
tion by reason of the incurable insanity of one (1) of them, the court shall 
grant a decree of absolute divorce upon the petition of the sane spouse if 
the proof shows that the insane spouse has been committed to an institu-
tion for the care and treatment of the insane for three (3) or more years 
prior to the filing of the suit, has been adjudged to be of unsound mind 
by a court of competent jurisdiction, and has not been discharged from 
such adjudication by the court and the proof of insanity is supported by 
the evidence of two (2) reputable physicians familiar with the mental 
condition of the spouse, one (1) of whom shall be a regularly practicing 
physician in the community wherein the spouse resided, and when the 
insane spouse has been confined in an institution for the care and treat-
ment of the insane, that the proof in the case is supported by the evidence 
of the superintendent or one (1) of the physicians of the institution 
wherein the insane spouse has been confined.
119
 
The code further provides that “[s]ervice of process upon an insane spouse 
shall be had by service of process upon the duly appointed, qualified, and 
 
 116. See, e.g., Faulkner v. Ark. Children’s Hosp., 347 Ark. 941, 952, 69 S.W.3d 393, 400 
(2002) (“When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, there is no need to resort 
to rules of statutory construction. Where the meaning is not clear, we look to the language of 
the statute, the subject matter, the object to be accomplished, the purpose to be served, the 
remedy provided, the legislative history, and other appropriate means that shed light on the 
subject.”). 
 117. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12-301 (Repl. 2009). 
 118. See id. § 9-12-301(b)(6)(A). 
 119. Id. (emphasis added). 
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acting guardian of the insane spouse or upon a duly appointed guardian ad 
litem for the insane spouse . . . .”120 
In sum, the statute does not mention whether the incompetent ward has 
the ability to petition the court for divorce; rather, it suggests that the court 
will only grant a divorce when the competent spouse brings an action for 
divorce.121 Also, the only role the guardian appears to play is to accept ser-
vice of process if the sane spouse files a petition.122 
Similarly, Arkansas guardianship law does not address whether a 
guardian has the authority to petition a court for divorce on behalf of a ward, 
as the statutory provision listing the actions for which a guardian can peti-
tion the court does not provide for the court to consider this issue.123 Arkan-
sas Code Annotated section 28-65-302 states as follows: 
No guardian appointed prior to October 1, 2001, shall make any of the 
following decisions without filing a petition and receiving express court 
approval: (A) Consent on behalf of the incapacitated person to abortion, 
sterilization, psychosurgery, or removal of bodily organs except when 
necessary in a situation threatening the life of the incapacitated; (B) Con-
sent to withholding life-saving treatment; (C) Authorize experimental 
medical procedures; (D) Authorize termination of parental rights; (E) 
Prohibit the incapacitated person from voting; (F) Prohibit the incapaci-
tated person from obtaining a driver’s license; or (G) Consent to a set-
tlement or compromise of any claim by or against the incapacitated per-
son or his or her estate.
124
 
Noticeably absent from that list is whether a guardian may petition the court 
for divorce on behalf of the ward. Because the provisions in neither the di-
vorce nor guardianship code explicitly grant or deny the guardian such au-
thority,125 these sections, in turn, do not necessarily aid courts faced with 
determining whether a guardian may bring a divorce action on behalf of an 
incompetent ward. 
 
 120. Id. § 9-12-301(b)(6)(C)(i). 
 121. See id. § 9-12-301(b)(6)(A). 
 122. See id. § 9-12-301(b)(6)(C)(i). 
 123. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-302 (Repl. 2012). 
 124. Id. § 28-65-302(a)(1)(A)–(G). The only difference under subsection (a)(2), which 
involves the rights of a guardian appointed after October 1, 2001, is that no guardian shall 
make a decision that involves authorizing an incapacitated person to vote without filing, 
petitioning, and receiving court approval. See id. § 28-65-302(a)(2)(E). 
 125. See id. § 9-12-301 (divorce); id. § 28-65-302 (guardianship). 
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2. Arkansas Lacks Case Law Addressing Whether a Guardian May 
File for Divorce on Behalf of a Ward 
Appellate courts in Arkansas have yet to provide a holding on the mer-
its, on which subsequent circuit courts may stand, as to whether a guardian 
may file for divorce on behalf of a ward absent statutory authority. In Jack-
son v. Bowman,126 the Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed a suit by an 
insane widow to set aside a previously granted divorce decree to her de-
ceased husband.127 The court ultimately held that the suit to set aside the 
divorce decree was proper because the property interests of the insane wid-
ow were vitally affected by the default divorce decree entered against her.128 
Additionally, service upon the husband’s executor as well as the husband’s 
attorney of record constituted sufficient and proper notice to allow the trial 
court to act on the petition to vacate.129 
In Jackson, the court further opined that, because her husband was 
mentally incompetent when he filed suit, the widow proved a meritorious 
defense to the divorce action.130 The court cited the general rule for sup-
port—when a statute that authorizes suit is absent, an insane person cannot 
bring an action for divorce because the right is strictly personal to the ag-
grieved spouse and no matrimonial offense automatically dissolves the mar-
riage.131 However, the court never addressed the guardian’s right to file for 
divorce, and the court’s mention of the general rule serves as dicta specific 
to the incompetent spouse’s ability to petition for divorce. 
Lovett v. Lovett132 followed almost twenty years later. Here, William 
Lovett, by his father and next friend, filed a petition for divorce.133 The Su-
preme Court of Arkansas found no evidence that William was ever under 
guardianship as to his person nor did he presently or recently need a person-
al guardian.134 Rather, guardianship over his estate was predicated on the 
need to manage his business affairs.135 Therefore, the court determined that 
the chancellor erred in not granting the petition for divorce.136 
In Lovett, the court cited to 19 American Law Reports section 20 and 
Jackson for recitation of the rule that, in the absence of a statute authorizing 
 
 126. 226 Ark. 753, 294 S.W.2d 344 (1956). 
 127. Id. at 754, 294 S.W.2d at 344. 
 128. Id. at 757, 294 S.W.2d at 346. 
 129. Id. at 757–58, 294 S.W.2d at 346. 
 130. Id. at 759, 294 S.W.2d at 347. 
 131. Id., 294 S.W.2d at 347. 
 132. 254 Ark. 349, 493 S.W.2d 435 (1973). 
 133. Id. at 350, 493 S.W.2d at 435. 
 134. Id. at 353, 493 S.W.2d at 437. 
 135. Id., 493 S.W.2d at 437. 
 136. Id. at 352, 493 S.W.2d at 437. 
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so, an insane person cannot institute an action for divorce.137 The court then 
noted, however, that in the same annotation it stated that, absent a legal ad-
judication of insanity, a person is presumed to have capacity to bring a di-
vorce action as long as the plaintiff can understand the nature of the ac-
tion.138 Thus, like Jackson, the court based its decision around the incompe-
tent’s right to file for divorce and did not determine the rights of a guardian. 
Most recently, the Arkansas Court of Appeals in Alexander v. Alexan-
der139 was presented with the issue of whether the lower court erred in grant-
ing a divorce decree to a spouse who was later declared to be incompetent.140 
Nevertheless, the court held on other grounds.141 Determining that there was 
no evidence that corroborated either party’s residence in Arkansas for the 
statutory period,142 the court held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to 
enter the divorce decree because statutory law precludes a grant of divorce 
without such corroboration of residency.143 
Having reached its holding on a jurisdictional ground, the court in Al-
exander decided that other issues need not be addressed.144 One of these 
issues was the Appellant’s contention that the trial court erred in granting a 
divorce decree to the Appellee because she was incompetent at the time the 
complaint was filed.145 Therefore, courts were, yet again, left void of a hold-
ing on which this issuewhether a guardian is legally entitled to bring an 
action for divorce on behalf of a ward—could be resolved. 
III. ARGUMENT 
Absent clear statutory authority that expressly grants or denies a guard-
ian the right to file for divorce on behalf of a ward, lower courts are faced 
with choosing either the majority or minority approach. Because circuit 
courts in Arkansas lack an appellate court holding that addresses whether a 
guardian may petition the court on behalf of a ward and because statutory 
authority does not explicitly grant or deny such authority, uncertainty per-
vades this issue. Arkansas legislators can be proactive, however, in propos-
ing legislation to explicitly grant a guardian the right to file for divorce on 
behalf of a ward. In doing so, this authority will avoid the inevitable result—
 
 137. See id. at 353–54, 493 S.W.2d at 437–38. 
 138. Lovett, 254 Ark. at 354, 493 S.W.2d at 438. 
 139. No. CA01-1246, 2002 WL 1204416 (Ark. Ct. App. June 5, 2002). 
 140. Id. at *1. 
 141. See id. 
 142. Id. at *2; see ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12-307 (Repl. 2009) (stating that residence in the 
state for sixty days by either party prior to commencement of the action must be proven). 
 143. Alexander, 2002 WL 1204416, at *2. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at *1. 
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courts legislating from the bench. Alternatively, if no such legislation is 
enacted, Arkansas courts should still follow the minority approach and then 
use a substituted judgment standard in determining whether to grant a di-
vorce action brought by a guardian. 
A. Due to the Current State of the Law in Arkansas, a Circuit Court Faced 
with Determining Whether a Guardian May File Suit on Behalf of a 
Ward Could Hold with Either the Majority or Minority 
When a court is presented with this issue, the role the majority rule 
would play in Arkansas is straightforward: absent statutory authority provid-
ing a guardian the right to file for divorce on behalf of a ward, a guardian 
may not do so.146 As previously provided, a court’s reasoning behind follow-
ing the majority approach lies in the personal and volitional nature of mar-
riage and the “lesser of two evils” notion.147 The application of this rule is 
not so straightforward, however, when courts consider the competing inter-
ests advocated by the minority.148 As illustrated in Part II, courts may con-
strue other statutes, individually or in totality, and grant a guardian the legal 
right to file for divorce.149 Consequently, unpredictability exists in cases of 
first impression. 
In Arkansas, language apt to result in statutory interpretation that 
would grant the guardian authority to bring a suit may be found under Ar-
kansas Code Annotated section 28-65-106. This section states that “[a]n 
incapacitated person for whom a guardian has been appointed is not pre-
sumed to be incompetent and retains all legal and civil rights except those 
which have been expressly limited by court order or have been specifically 
granted by order to the guardian by the court.”150 Like Ruvalcaba and Nel-
son, an Arkansas court could construe this language broadly and reason that 
the statute explicitly states that an incapacitated person retains all legal and 
civil rights, which would include divorce because divorce is a civil proceed-
ing. 
Of course, under this section, the court cannot turn to the latter part of 
this statute for clarity. A ward’s legal right to file for divorce has not been 
expressly limited by court order nor has a guardian’s right to bring action 
 
 146. Wood v. Beard, 107 So. 2d 198, 199 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (“The rule is well 
established in the United States by the overwhelming weight of authority that a guardian of a 
mentally incompetent person cannot bring and maintain an action for divorce on behalf of his 
insane ward unless there has been legislative enactment to authorize such procedure.”). 
 147. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 148. See supra Part II.C.2. 
 149. See supra Part II.C.1. 
 150. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-106 (Repl. 2012) (emphasis added). 
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been expressly granted.151 Subsequently, this language leaves the court in a 
dilemma when determining whether a guardian has authority to file for di-
vorce on behalf of the ward. 
Additionally, like Luster, the court could read Arkansas Code Annotat-
ed section 28-65-106 in tandem with another statute, such as Arkansas Code 
Annotated section 28-65-301, in granting the guardian the right to file action 
on behalf of the ward. Section 28-65-301 states that “[i]t shall be the duty of 
the guardian of the person, consistent with and out of the resources of the 
ward’s estate, to care for and maintain the ward . . . .”152 Arguably, caring 
for and maintaining the ward would include deciding whether it best for the 
ward to remain in his or her marriage. 
Moreover, the court could also read Arkansas Code Annotated sections 
28-65-106 and 28-65-305 together. Section 28-65-305 provides the follow-
ing: 
When there is a guardian of the estate, all actions between the ward or 
the guardian and third persons in which it is sought to charge or to bene-
fit the estate of the ward shall be prosecuted by or against the guardian 
of the estate as guardian, and the guardian shall represent the interests of 
the ward in the action.
153
 
It is important to note that this provision concerns the guardian’s power over 
the estate, not the ward’s person. Nevertheless, it is possible that a court 
may construe whatever statute it may find useful to determine this issue. 
Therein lies the need for clarity—the need to explicitly give the court guid-
ance. 
B. The Arkansas General Assembly Should Propose Legislation That 
Grants a Guardian the Right to Bring Divorce Proceedings on Behalf of 
a Ward 
Though this note proposes that the rationale behind the minority ap-
proach is ultimately more applicable than the majority approach and should 
be adopted by the court in the event it is presented with this issue absent 
statutory authority, this matter can be addressed prior to reaching an appel-
late court. Specifically, the Arkansas General Assembly can address this 
issue now by enacting a statute that gives the guardian a definitive legal 
right to bring a divorce action on behalf of a ward. 
 
 151. See id. § 28-65-302 (Repl. 2012). 
 152. Id. § 28-65-301(a)(1) (Repl. 2012) (emphasis added). 
 153. Id. § 28-65-305(a) (Repl. 2012) (emphasis added). 
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1. Other States’ Approaches That Provide Guidance 
In Indiana, specific statutory authority addresses the legal right of the 
guardian to bring dissolution proceedings.154 Section 29-3-9-12.2 states in 
relevant part that “[i]f a guardian of an incapacitated person determines that 
a dissolution of the incapacitated person’s marriage is in the best interests of 
the incapacitated person, the guardian shall petition the court to request the 
authority to petition for a dissolution of marriage on behalf of the incapaci-
tated person.”155 
In comparison, Missouri’s statutory code section 475.091 provides the 
following: 
Upon finding that the transaction was or is beneficial to the protectee, the 
court may approve, ratify, confirm and validate any transaction entered 
into by a conservator of the estate, without court authorization which it 
has power under this section to authorize the conservator to conduct. The 
power of the court to approve, ratify, confirm and validate transactions 
entered into by a conservator of the estate without court authorization in-
cludes, without limitation, . . . the power to make, ratify and undertake 
proceedings for, and agreements incident to, dissolution of the marriage 
of the protectee.
156
 
In Parmer v. Michaels,157 a Missouri court turned to this statute, specifically, 
in addressing and refuting appellant’s argument that “no specific statute 
authorizes a guardian to proceed in a dissolution action for an incapacitated 
person . . . .”158 
In drafting legislation, the Arkansas General Assembly could also look 
to the court rules cited by the Michigan Court of Appeals in Smith v. 
Smith.159 For example, when deciding whether a mentally incompetent 
spouse could bring a divorce action through her guardian, the court in Smith 
turned to two General Court Rules that existed at the time this case was de-
cided and concluded that the guardian may do so.160 First, the court looked at 
 
 154. See IND. CODE § 29-3-9-12.2 (West 2014). 
 155. Id. § 29-3-9-12.2(a)(1), (3) (citations omitted). This section subsequently includes 
the role of the court in granting the guardian’s petition. See id. § 29-3-9-12.2(d)–(g). 
 156. MO. ANN. STAT. § 475.091 (West 2009). 
 157. 755 S.W.2d 5 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988). 
 158. Id. at 6. The court, citing Missouri Annotated Statute section 475.110, also added 
that the language in that section reveals that the legislature “contemplate[d] that incapacitated 
persons may be parties to divorce action.” Id. at 6–7. That section provides that “[w]hen the 
spouse of an incapacitated or disabled person is appointed his guardian or conservator, such 
spouse shall be removed as guardian or conservator upon dissolution of his marriage with the 
incapacitated or disabled person.” MO. ANN. STAT. § 475.110 (West 2009). 
 159. 335 N.W.2d 657 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983). 
 160. See id. at 658. 
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General Court Rule 1963, 722.2.161 This rule provided that “[a]ctions for 
divorce and separate maintenance by or against incompetent persons shall 
be brought as provided in sub-rule 201.5.”162 Then, the court examined sub-
rule 201.5, which provided that “[w]henever an infant or incompetent per-
son has a guardian of his estate, actions may be brought and shall be defend-
ed by such guardian in [sic] behalf of the infant or incompetent person.”163 
Finally, Florida provides further illustration.164 Florida Statutes Anno-
tated section 61.052 states that “[n]o judgment of dissolution of marriage 
shall be granted unless one of the following facts appears, which shall be 
pleaded generally: . . . Mental incapacity of one of the parties.”165 Addition-
ally, section 744.3215 states that “[w]ithout first obtaining specific authority 
from the court . . . a guardian may not [i]nitiate a petition for dissolution of 
marriage for the ward.”166 In Vaughan v. Vaughan,167 a Florida court relied 
on these sections and concluded that section 61.052 gives the guardian au-
thority to initiate dissolution.168 Given this backdrop of statutory code from 
numerous states, the Arkansas General Assembly has an adequate amount of 
guidance from which to draw upon in drafting legislation. 
2. The Arkansas General Assembly Should Enact a New Subsection 
to Its Guardianship Law or Follow Either Indiana’s or Florida’s 
Approach 
The Arkansas General Assembly has the opportunity to grant a guardi-
an the legal right to file for divorce on behalf of a ward in multiple sections 
of the Arkansas Code. Under guardianship law, the following proposed leg-
islation could fit into section 28-65-302, which currently grants certain pow-
ers to guardians upon petition to the court.169 Subsection (a)(1) to section 28-
65-302 states that “[n]o guardian . . . shall make any of the following deci-
sions without filing a petition and receiving express court approval” and 
 
 161. See id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. See id. 
 164. This is not an exhaustive list of states to which the Arkansas General Assembly can 
turn. The listed states merely provide good examples. 
 165. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.052(1)(b) (West 2006). 
 166. Id. § 744.3215(4)(c) (West 2010) (citations omitted). 
 167. 648 So. 2d 193 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994). 
 168. Id. at 195. The court also determined that section 744.3215 was enacted when “the 
legislature clearly envisioned circumstances which would justify authorizing a guardian to 
undertake the admittedly very personal act of seeking a dissolution on behalf of an incapaci-
tated ward.” Id. 
 169. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-302 (Repl. 2012). 
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then lists those subsequent decisions.170 Thus, for example, the following 
could be added to the current list: 
(H) Dissolution of marriage on behalf of the incapacitated person. 
In the alternative, Arkansas legislators could replicate Indiana’s statute and 
create an entirely new section that directly addresses petition by the guardi-
an for the dissolution of marriage.171 In either case, both provisions would be 
superior to the court rules in Michigan, where cross-references were neces-
sary for the court in Smith to ultimately grant a guardian authority.172 
Another option the Arkansas General Assembly could take would be to 
follow Florida’s lead and amend its current divorce statute. Arkansas Code 
Annotated section 9-12-301 currently states the following: 
The circuit court shall have power to dissolve and set aside a marriage 
contract, not only from bed and board, but from the bonds of matrimony, 
for the following causes: In all cases in which a husband and wife have 
lived separate and apart for three (3) consecutive years without cohabita-
tion by reason of the incurable insanity of one (1) of them, the court shall 
grant a decree of absolute divorce upon the petition of the sane spouse if 
the proof shows . . . .
173
 
As indicated by the language used in the statute—”upon the petition of the 
sane spouse”—the insane spouse lacks legal authority.174 Admittedly, a par-
ty could make the argument that if the legislature had intended to grant the 
insane spouse the authority to do so, then it would have included that right 
expressly. Nevertheless, as exemplified in Ruvalcaba, this argument can be, 
and has been, rejected in favor of the alternative—the notion that had the 
legislature wanted to deny the insane spouse the right, it would have ex-
pressly done that too.175 
If the Arkansas General Assembly followed Florida’s approach, one 
option would be to state that the “[m]ental incapacity of one of the parties” 
is one of the causes for which the circuit court can dissolve and set aside a 
marriage,176 without limiting such action to “the petition of the sane spouse” 
as it currently does.177 As held in Vaughan, this provision could give the 
 
 170. See id. 
 171. See IND. CODE § 29-3-9-12.2 (West 2014); supra Part III.B.1. 
 172. See Smith v. Smith, 335 N.W.2d 657, 658 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983); supra Part III.B.1. 
 173. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12-301(b)(6)(A) (Repl. 2009) (emphasis added). 
 174. See id. 
 175. See Ruvalcaba v. Ruvalcaba, 850 P.2d 674, 678 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993); supra Part 
II.C.1. 
 176. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.052(1)(b) (West 2006); supra Part III.B.1. 
 177. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12-301(b)(6)(A). 
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guardian the “authority to initiate dissolution.”178 A second option would be 
for the Arkansas General Assembly to add the following bracketed language 
to the currently existing form: 
. . . the court shall grant a decree of absolute divorce upon the petition of 
the sane spouse [or insane spouse, through his or her guardian,] if the 
proof shows . . . .
179
 
Though the former proposal has sufficed in granting a guardian the legal 
right to file for divorce on behalf of a ward, implementing language similar 
to the latter proposal would be the most direct method in resolving the issue 
at hand because it unambiguously grants the guardian express authority. 
In sum, if the Arkansas General Assembly decides to take action, it 
would not be the first legislative body to do so.180 Other states have codified 
this right, and courts that have adjudicated this issue have relied on that cod-
ification in determining the rights of the guardian.181 By giving courts statu-
tory authority on which to stand, the Arkansas General Assembly can ade-
quately and proactively address this issue and, by doing so, prevent the pos-
sibility that courts will be forced to legislate from the bench. 
C. In the Absence of Legislation, Arkansas Appellate Courts Should Still 
Employ the Minority Approach in Granting a Guardian the Legal Right 
to Petition the Court for Divorce 
Notwithstanding that the best option would be for the Arkansas Gen-
eral Assembly to propose legislation that explicitly grants a guardian the 
right to file for divorce on behalf of a ward, courts should, in the alternative, 
hold with the minority. Once a guardian has the legal authority to petition 
the court for divorce on behalf of a ward, provided for either under statute or 
by court authority, the court must next decide whether to grant the divorce. 
In the absence of present evidence showing the ward’s desire to divorce, the 
court should grant the divorce based on a substituted judgment standard as 
opposed to a best interests standard. 
1. The Minority Approach Is the More Applicable Approach Given 
Societal Changes and an Already Expansive Guardianship Law 
In light of the reasons previously set out above, an appellate court 
could read that either guardianship or divorce statutes, or their effect in tan-
 
 178. See Vaughan v. Vaughan, 648 So. 2d 193, 195 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); supra Part 
III.B.1. 
 179. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12-301(b)(6)(A). 
 180. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 181. See supra Part III.B.1. 
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dem, grants a guardian the legal right to bring a suit for divorce on behalf of 
the ward.182 Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that if the court is persuad-
ed by the principles of the minority position, then the court would be even 
more likely to construe a statute as broadly as possible to grant that right. In 
declining to impose a per se ban on the guardian’s right to bring a divorce 
suit, courts should be heavily persuaded not only by the minority’s founda-
tional inequity argument183 but also by the broad power granted to guardians 
in Arkansas specifically,184 as well as changing societal notions concerning 
divorce.185 
Currently, statutory authority in Arkansas grants guardians the authori-
ty to petition the court and potentially make decisions on behalf of the ward 
that concern the following: 
(A) Consent on behalf of the incapacitated person to abortion, steriliza-
tion, psychosurgery, or removal of bodily organs except when necessary 
in a situation threatening the life of the incapacitated; (B) Consent to 
withholding life-saving treatment; (C) Authorize experimental medical 
procedures; (D) Authorize termination of parental rights; (E) Prohibit 
the incapacitated person from voting; (F) Prohibit the incapacitated per-
son from obtaining a driver’s license; or (G) Consent to a settlement or 
compromise of any claim by or against the incapacitated person or his or 
her estate.
186
 
It would stand to reason that divorce is no more volitional or personal in 
nature than some of the decisions in this statute. As the court in Ruvalcaba 
aptly surmises, “in this day and age, when guardians are permitted to refuse 
medical care on behalf of their incompetent wards—surely a decision that is 
extremely ‘personal’ to that individual—prohibiting that same guardian 
from maintaining an action for dissolution on behalf of the ward cannot be 
justified.”187 For example, if physical or mental impairment does not destroy 
the ward’s right to refuse medical treatment, impairment would also not 
extinguish the incompetent’s right to petition for divorce.188 Effectively, the 
majority’s primary policy rationale loses ground when it is compared to the 
expansive guardianship provisions currently employed in this state. 
Moreover, societal pressure and no-fault divorce laws further advance 
the argument that guardians should be able to file for divorce on behalf of 
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the ward.189 As opposed to narrowing no-fault divorce laws, the tendency 
has been toward liberalizing them.190 During the 1960s, a uniform no-fault 
divorce system began to replace fault-based divorce laws,191 and every state 
in the union recognized no-fault divorce by 1985.192 Essentially, no-fault 
divorce reform gave autonomy to the individual193 and allowed for marriage 
to be “freely and unilaterally terminable.”194 Thus, the consent of both par-
ties was no longer a requisite for divorce. 
The result of this legislation and, ultimately, the ability of one spouse 
to unilaterally dissolve the marriage was that the institution of marriage was 
forever tarnished moving forward.195 Today, the divorce rate has reached an 
estimated fifty percent.196 The correlation between the two cannot go unno-
ticed for the rate of divorce post no-fault divorce legislation is staggering. 
After no-fault divorce laws were introduced in the 1960s, the divorce rate 
nearly doubled over the next ten years.197 
Importantly, with the adoption of no-fault divorce laws, “[s]ociety 
[had] entered a new era.”198 These laws illustrated, to some extent, that soci-
ety no longer condemned divorce.199 Additionally, since the enactment of 
these laws, “society has continued in its acceptance and accommodation of 
the life changes it has brought.”200 Specifically, because this accommodation 
extends to the courts, the court’s role transformed from one designed to pro-
tect marriage to one designed to administer the dissolution of marriage in a 
fair manner for the parties.201 In sum, “in [the] days of . . . no-fault dissolu-
tions and the other vagaries of a vastly changing society, . . . an absolute rule 
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[that guardians have no authority to seek a divorce or dissolution] is not 
justified nor in the public interest.”202 
2. Courts Should Employ a Substituted Judgment Standard over a 
Best Interests Standard to Grant a Divorce 
The mere authority for a guardian to bring action does not suggest that 
courts should proceed without caution in granting a divorce action brought 
by the guardian,203 and the guardian should bear the burden in proving a 
factual basis that supports divorce.204 Once the “courthouse door[s]” are 
opened to allow a guardian to bring a divorce suit, however, the court should 
then follow the substituted judgment standard in granting divorce when the 
ward cannot express his or her wishes.205 
Either standard protects against abuse by the guardian,206 but the substi-
tuted judgment standard is the more appropriate standard for the trial court 
to apply for two reasons: (1) this standard involves the trial court consider-
ing evidence of “the ward’s prior or present acts, beliefs and disposition 
toward the proposed divorce” in determining what choice the ward would 
have made if competent,207 and (2) a best interests standard is inadequate for 
determining the interests of the ward because it is applied only when no 
evidence of the ward’s intent exists.208 It follows that by employing a best 
interests standard the court would be adding yet another layer of decision 
making on behalf of a ward. 
In contrast with the best interests standard, a substituted judgment 
standard allows the incompetent ward to retain his choice, which promotes 
human dignity and self-determination.209 In essence, this standard attempts 
to treat the incompetent “as an individual with free choice and moral digni-
ty, and not as someone whose preferences no longer matter[].”210 This au-
tonomy is achieved because the guardian either has actual knowledge of 
what the ward would have done in the present circumstances or, based on 
the ward’s prior general statements, actions, values, or preferences, the 
guardian may understand what the ward would have done in the circum-
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stances.211 Thus, the decision stands as that of the ward’s, and the court 
simply acts as a “mouthpiece.”212 In contrast, the best interests standard re-
sults in the court taking responsibility for the decision213 and acting like the 
parent of an infant with reduced rights.214 
In support of why the substituted judgment standard is more appropri-
ate, Arkansas courts may turn to prior case law. For example, Ruvalcaba 
provides guidance in applying the substituted judgment standard.215 The 
Ruvalcaba court, having determined that a guardian could initiate divorce 
proceedings, addressed the evidentiary standard for deciding whether this 
particular guardian-initiated divorce was proper.216 
In Ruvalcaba, evidence existed of the incompetent ward’s desires con-
cerning divorce at a time when she was competent.217 The court determined 
that a trial court could consider any admissible evidence of the ward’s de-
sires while competent, which may include written manifestations or state-
ments made to third parties.218 Notably, the court allowed third-party testi-
monial evidence out of necessity and under hearsay exceptions.219 Regarding 
this testimony, the court provided that the trial court has deference in as-
sessing the truthfulness of third parties’ testimony and determining the ap-
propriate weight to give this testimony.220 Ultimately, a trial court could 
proceed in granting a divorce if dissolution was what the ward would 
want221 after concluding the ward’s preferences and general values regarding 
marriage, divorce, and manner of living.222 
Likewise, in Nelson, the court determined that the guardian may testify 
about conversations where the ward expressed his or her desires prior to 
 
 211. Lawrence A. Frolik & Linda S. Whitton, The UPC Substituted Judgment/Best Inter-
est Standard for Guardian Decisions: A Proposal for Reform, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 739, 
753–54 (2012). Under the latter, although the guardian does not have definitive information 
as to what the ward wants, the guardian effectively best estimates what the ward would have 
done by making reasonable inferences. Id. at 754. 
 212. Weber, supra note 106, at 137. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. at 138. 
 215. See Ruvalcaba v. Ruvalcaba, 850 P.2d 674, 682 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993). 
 216. See id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. at 683. 
 221. Ruvalcaba, 850 P.2d at 681–82. 
 222. Id. This court even heightened the burden of proof to a clear and convincing stand-
ard. Id. at 683. Though preponderance of evidence is all that is required in civil cases, the 
court reasoned that an elevated standard was necessary because the dissolution of marriage 
involved personal interests that were more complex and important than those of a typical 
civil suit. Id. 
2016] GUARDIANS' RIGHT TO FILE FOR DIVORCE 297 
becoming incompetent.223 The court opined that the values of the ward 
should be primary in determining whether the guardian should file for di-
vorce.224 Thus, when the court is convinced by testimony from friends, fami-
ly members, clergy, or other sources with knowledge that the ward would 
not have wanted divorce under any circumstances, the court should uphold 
the ward’s wishes.225 However, when there is evidence of an expressed de-
sire to end the marriage prior to becoming incapacitated, the court should 
not prohibit a guardian from bringing action.226 In such case, the trial court 
may consider the evidence in granting or denying a divorce.227 
In contrast with Ruvalcaba and Nelson, the court in Kronberg v. 
Kronberg228 addressed a case in which evidence of intent was lacking.229 
After determining that statutory authority granted a guardian the right to 
initiate divorce on behalf of a ward,230 the court next determined what was in 
the best interest of the ward.231 Even with no evidence of the ward’s intent, 
the court ultimately upheld the guardian’s ability to obtain a divorce on be-
half of the ward,232 basing its holding on the ward’s interest in the estate and 
equitable property rights.233 
Whereas a substituted judgment standard provides a court with objec-
tive evidence of the ward’s intent to dissolve the marriage,234 the same is not 
always true with a best interests standard.235 It is one thing to claim that a 
per se rule denying guardians the legal authority to bring divorce is improp-
er and to then advocate for proposed legislation that would at least grant a 
guardian this legal right. It is quite another to suggest that a court can make 
a subsequent judgment on behalf of the ward without any objective evidence 
of the ward’s desires. 
In bringing suit, the guardian is a third party making a decision for the 
ward. Equally, under a best interests standard, the court would also be a 
third party making a decision for the ward. However, this ensuing extension 
of power to the court under a best interests standard would go too far be-
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cause it adds another layer of decision making on behalf of a ward. Ideally, 
a substituted judgment standard is able to prevent that additional third-party 
decision by the court and allow the ward, to an extent, to retain his volition 
in the marriage. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
An Arkansas appellate court will inevitably face the issue of determin-
ing a guardian’s right to file for divorce on behalf of a ward, just as other 
state courts have in the past236 and especially given the growth of the elderly 
population237 and high rates of divorce in this country.238 In the absence of 
explicit statutory authority either granting a guardian the right to file for 
divorce on behalf of a ward or denying the guardian such right, an appellate 
court would be forced to consider the rationale behind the majority and mi-
nority rules in reaching a conclusion. The unpredictability of a court’s deci-
sion is pause for concern—concern that merits attention. 
Because appellate courts have yet to hold on the merits of this issue239 
and because divorce law and guardianship law fail to explicitly provide 
guidance,240 Arkansas courts are left without a clear answer. Therefore, the 
time is ripe for action, and the most obvious answer to prevent courts from 
being put in this position is legislation. By being proactive, the Arkansas 
General Assembly can prevent this issue from rearing its head in court and, 
thereby, prevent courts from being forced to legislate from the bench. 
The proposed legislation encapsulates the trending aims of guardian-
ship power by permitting a guardian to bring an action for the dissolution of 
marriage on behalf of a ward.241 Then, once the action reaches the court, the 
court should follow a substituted judgment standard in granting or denying 
the divorce.242 To that end, the ward will still play a role in the ultimate dis-
solution of his or her marriage and, therefore, address the concerns of the 
majority opinion amongst the states.243 
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